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Introduction
The development of European foreign policy, understood here as the collective external action of European Community (EC) and then European Union (EU) Member States has been a key feature of the European integration project since the late 1960s (Allen and Wallace 1977; Forster 2004; Wallace 1996, 2000; Nuttall 1992 Nuttall , 2000 Peterson and Sjursen 1998; Wallace 2005) (Howorth 2005 (Howorth , 2007 . As a result, not only has the European Union developed a system of continuous diplomatic coordination through the CFSP, it has also begun to create the capacity to deploy military power, albeit in a restricted range of contexts and with a restricted set of purposes. Arguably, this process has made the EU into a diplomatic and even military 'power' to range alongside the leading states within the world arena (Hill and Smith 2005 Alliance' have been well-documented (Allen and Smith 1989; McGuire and Smith 2008; Peterson 1996; Peterson and Pollack 2003; Smith 2005 ).
In the context of this article, though, it is of the greatest importance that European foreign policy has frequently been catalysed or constrained by the development of relations between the United States, Europe and the Islamic world. Initially, the key focus of this entanglement was the Arab-Israeli dispute, especially in the context of the October War, the 1970s oil crises and the increasing attention to the issue of the Palestinians (Allen and Pijpers 1982) . The 1980s Venice Declaration of the European Community was a first significant sign that the collective diplomatic position of the Europeans might diverge from that of the Americans and Israel; the rights of the Palestinians and the centrality of the issue of Palestinian statehood have remained key to European collective positions ever since. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has played an active role in the 'greater Middle East' both diplomatically through the CFSP and more broadly in the provision of support for peacebuilding processes, and have become an established member of the 'quartet' attempting to sponsor a long-term peace framework (Ortega 2003; Youngs 2006 How well has European foreign policy served the EU in responding to these challenges? And how might the challenges be dealt with in the future?
In order to understand at least some of the answers to these questions, this article examines in detail the forces lying behind recent developments in European foreign policy, and relates those forces to the challenges and opportunities arising from developments in the 'triangle of forces' constituted by Europe, the United States and the Islamic world. First, it presents a short review of the notion of the EU as a 'power', with attention to the relationship between 'soft' and 'hard' power, and relates this to the perspectives of policymakers. Second, it sets out the three key logics that seem to drive the development of European foreign policy, and explores some key trends emerging from those logics. Finally, it relates the earlier argument directly to the ways in which the EU finds itself as part of the 'triangle of forces' composed of itself, the US and the Islamic world, and takes up a number of the central themes in this Special Issue. The article concludes by suggesting some potential futures for the relationships, linking them to the potential future of European foreign policy.
Foreign Policy, Power and the European Model
There is well established interest in the ways in which the European Union (EU) has become a 'power' in international politics, and to exploration of the implications of this status (Hill and Smith 2005: Introduction and Conclusion; Sjursen 2007; Aggestam 2008) . A key strand of discussion has been the analysis of the relationship between 'soft' or 'civilian' power (often also linked with arguments about 'normative power' or 'ethical' power') and 'hard power', linked with the development of a 'real' foreign policy for the EU (Manners 2006; K. Smith 2005; M. Smith 2006b) . Often, the analysis has been extended into consideration of issues such as roles and identity, on the assumption that these issues can be explored in order to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics of European foreign policy formation, and of the ways European foreign policy works when projected into the external world (Elgström and Smith 2006; Aggestam 2004) . European foreign policy is thus in some ways a test-bed for the exploration of key theoretical issues about foreign policy in a post-sovereign and post-Cold War world (Sjursen 2003; M. Smith 2003; White 2001 ). In particular, the EU's move along the spectrum between 'soft' power and 'hard' power, and the implications for legitimacy and accountability in European foreign policy, have formed a key conceptual focus.
'European foreign policy', though, is not simply a field for the study of abstractions and for intellectual sport. It is one of the key arenas for political contestation in setting the agenda for the future development of the EU itself. European prosperity and security, the potential of the EU as a model of regional cooperation, and the need in this cause to deploy both 'soft' and 'hard' power in the promotion of democracy and the treatment of conflict in the wider world (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006 
Three Logics of European Foreign Policy
European foreign policy has developed during the past forty years (taking the Hague Summit of 1969 as a key initial step) in response to three logics. The first is the logic of the integration process, which creates pressures for institutional change and policy innovation as a means of stabilising and consolidating the internal forces released by 'ever-closer union'. The second is the logic of the external opportunity structure, which creates opportunities and challenges for an integrating Europe in the world arena, and which thereby can demand change and innovation at the level of international action. The third logic is that of European identity, which creates pressures for the challenges and opportunities are out there and the task is to steer between them using the instruments of European foreign policy.
The reality, however, is not so simple, and it challenges the presumption that there might be a unified or uniform 'European' approach to foreign policy in this area. What appears to be a triangle of (separate) forces is in reality a deeply interpenetrated set of relationships, in which the EU finds itself a central focus and which (as outlined above) intersects with the three central logics of European foreign policy. The United States is not just 'out there' for the EU: it is inside the EU culturally, economically, politically and in terms of the strategic practices and priorities to which most European defence establishments still subscribe. In a similar way, the Islamic world is not just 'out there': it exists within the EU in terms of domestic Islamic populations, and in terms of cultures that have been shaped by the results of many centuries of interaction. As noted above, neither the American nor the Islamic presence is uniform and unvarying, but neither can be ignored as a factor in the internal European integration process. In this way, the 'triangle of forces' intersects with the 'integration logic' in the EU and in European foreign policy to shape the ways in which European foreign policy-makers approach their external tasks.
The 'triangle of forces' also intersects with the 'identity logic' of European foreign policy, since it presents the Europeans with competing 'others' and with the need to define 'Europeanness' in some ways as distinct from both the United States and the Islamic world. This is not an easy task,
given the admitted difficulties of defining a European identity for a Union of 27
Member States, and it is of course complicated further by the unevenness of experience and contact between the Member States and both of these outside forces. It has often been noted that a number of EU Member States have 'special relationships' with the USA, but it is equally significant that many of them also have 'special relationships' with the Islamic world, whether this is The reality is that the EU is not really in a position to choose one or the other of these trajectories. As argued in this article, it has already been pushed onto terrain where the risks are higher, the potential costs higher and the stakes both for the EU and its Member States higher. The interaction of the three foreign policy logics outlined in this paper has created a kind of ratchet effect, where there is no going back to the safer terrain of 'soft' or 'civilian power'. When to the interaction of the three logics is added the operation of the 'triangle of forces', the EU and its Member States find themselves with little room for manoeuvre, because of the ways in which these linked forces converge on the principles and practice of European foreign policy. There may well be arguments within the EU, both at the level of the policy community and at a broader popular level in the context of treaty ratification, about the choices that the EU ought to make. But in many ways these are arguments at the margin, about how to respond to the situation in which the EU now finds itself. As argued in this paper, this situation can best be characterised as 'between "soft power" and a hard place'.
